Accounting Institutions Emerge Very Early in an Economy’s Development by Sudipta Basu et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accounting Institutions Emerge Very Early in an Economy’s Development 
 
 
 
Sudipta Basu
1, Marcus Kirk
2, Greg Waymire
2* 
1. Fox School of Business, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19122 USA 
2. Goizueta Business School, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322, USA 
 
 
Draft as of April 23, 2008 
 
 
Abstract 
The “paper trail” of receipts and vouchers that is subsequently recorded in the journal 
entry provides the foundation for modern accounting. In this paper, we trace the impact 
of the recordkeeping function of accounting on small societies. Our tests, which use the 
ethnographic data in the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS), indicate that 
recordkeeping is a foundational institution that originates very early in an economy’s 
development. Recordkeeping promotes the emergence of economic institutions such as 
markets, hierarchies and specialized division of labor.  These economic institutions in 
turn foster favorable societal outcomes such as agricultural success, political stability, 
and investment in tangible and human capital. 
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1. Introduction 
  The foundation of modern accounting is a simple recordkeeping function 
represented in artifacts known as “receipts,” “vouchers,” and the “journal entry.” When 
does recordkeeping surface in the course of a society’s development? It is difficult to 
imagine families and small hunter-gatherer groups bound by kinship using even basic 
accounting for their internal dealings. Indeed, formal recording of transactions will likely 
be repugnant to family members or close friends (Silk 2004). At the other extreme are 
modern civilizations characterized by frequent long-term cooperative interactions 
between strangers. It is equally hard to imagine that these economies could function 
without well-developed recordkeeping and accounting systems. The receipt, for example, 
is ubiquitous to even mundane economic exchange in developed economies. We argue 
that accounting records play a critical role in facilitating societal expansion from small 
kin-based groups such as clans and tribes to modern civilizations. 
  Two complementary perspectives suggest that accounting institutions emerge 
early in economic development. Basu and Waymire (2006) hypothesize that 
recordkeeping appears early in an economy’s development as a device to sustain agents’ 
reputation for trustworthy behavior. Recordkeeping enables scale expansion and division 
of labor in an exchange economy, which implies that recordkeeping will emerge before 
markets, organizations, and supporting institutions. Another perspective is that 
accounting emerges early in response to fundamental stewardship and valuation demands 
for accounting information from complex hierarchical organizations and capital suppliers 
(Watts and Zimmerman 1986, pp. 196-8). This view differs somewhat in that causality 
runs from extant economic arrangements to accounting, which suggests that although 
accounting may emerge early, it will do so after the appearance of economic exchange 
and organizations as well as supporting institutions such as money. Both of these  
 
2 
 
complementary perspectives raise an empirical question of first-order importance: When 
do basic accounting institutions like recordkeeping appear as an economy grows in scale 
and complexity?  
  We provide evidence on this question by examining the emergence of 
recordkeeping and its association with the development of economic institutions and 
resultant societal outcomes using the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample developed by 
Murdock and White (1969). This data set provides extensive coded data for a variety of 
cultural variables - over 2,000 as of 2007 - constructed from published field research by 
ethnographers. Data are available for 186 societies chosen by Murdock and White (1969) 
to maximize the cross-society independence of observations.
   
We first demonstrate that recordkeeping emerges very early in an economy’s 
development. Using social group size as a measure of developmental stage, we document 
that recordkeeping appears after primitive agriculture and simple division of labor, at the 
same stage as the use of money, storage of food surplus, and inheritance rights in land, 
and before credit arrangements, functioning judiciaries, and administrative hierarchies. 
Recordkeeping becomes more prevalent after group size has reached the limit (200 
persons) beyond which the unaided human brain can no longer reliably store information 
on past social interactions (Dunbar 2001).  
Economic institutions reflecting development of market exchange, division of 
labor, use of hierarchies and government, and demographic features capturing complexity 
of social interaction are significantly and positively associated with a society’s use of 
recordkeeping. This is consistent with the Basu and Waymire (2006) prediction that 
recordkeeping is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the development of complex 
economies characterized by market exchange and division of labor.   
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Most important, institutional variables capturing the development of market 
exchange, division of labor, use of hierarchies and government, and demographic features 
are significantly associated with favorable societal outcomes such as agricultural success, 
political stability, and investments in tangible and human capital. Recordkeeping is also 
strongly associated with these outcome measures on a stand-alone basis, but this 
association is mostly eliminated when the variables reflecting institutional development 
are included in our empirical models. This is consistent with the prediction that 
recordkeeping promotes favorable societal outcomes, but it does so primarily by enabling 
beneficial institutions rather than leading to those outcomes directly. 
  More generally, our evidence is consistent with prior assertions that accounting is 
a necessary component of the engine that drives capitalist economic development. 
Werner Sombart hypothesized that double-entry bookkeeping was responsible for the 
emergence of capitalist economies (Most 1972). Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter 
advanced variants of this hypothesis (Carruthers and Espeland 1991). Von Mises (1998, 
210-232) hypothesized a central role for accounting in facilitating economic calculation 
that is the basis for entrepreneurial decision-making. Our findings are also important 
since they support De Soto (2000)’s contention that good property records are a 
prerequisite for the success of a capitalistic society. Thus, our evidence raises the real 
possibility that basic transactional data collected and summarized by accounting provides 
the basis for spontaneous market orders that arise from decentralized economic decisions 
within a competitive process (Smith 1776; Hayek 1968; Smith 2003; North 2005).  
  We first describe the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample because those data have not 
been used previously in the accounting literature. We next state our and then provide 
evidence on those predictions using the data in the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample. 
Concluding remarks are then offered.  
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2. Sample and Data 
  The Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS) provides a cross-section of 
ethnographic “snapshots” that we use to investigate cross-cultural variation in 
recordkeeping practices throughout the world. These pictures capture multiple elements 
of a culture or society in a location at a specific point in time. Because these data have 
not been previously used in the accounting literature, we describe the construction of this 
sample in some depth. 
Murdock and White (1969) constructed the SCCS to standardize the data used in 
cross-cultural research and facilitate statistical analysis. Paying careful attention to 
ethnographic distributions, Murdock and White (1969) included 186 societies in 
dispersed locations and time periods. The SCCS societies include contemporary hunter-
gatherers, early historic states, and contemporary industrial societies. The data in Panels 
A and B of Figure 1 confirm that the SCCS cultures are sampled from a wide range of 
time periods (including two from before the Common Era) and geographical locations. 
This reflects the effect of Murdock and White’s (1967) conscious decision to mitigate 
biases that favored societies with English language ethnographic sources. 
< Insert Figure 1 Here > 
The SCCS also was designed to standardize researchers’ choice of societies. 
Previous researchers had tended to analyze their own selection of specific societies, 
which often was based on small samples that were not comparable across studies. The 
SCCS helped standardize researchers’ choice of societies and has improved cross-study 
comparability. 
A major purpose in constructing the SCCS was to increase the extent to which 
statistically valid inferences could be drawn from ethnographic data. Specifically, prior  
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studies had often used data that lacked independence. Cross-cultural correlation in 
cultural practices arises from the diffusion of those practices among cultures with a 
common heritage. Anthropologists have recognized this problem (referred to as Galton’s 
Problem) for over a century. Murdock and White (1967) dealt with this problem by 
“pinpointing” their societies to specific locales and dates. The pinpointing of societies 
permitted selection of cultures with weaker cultural and historical diffusion relationships 
– i.e., the SCCS was constructed to maximize independence in terms of cultural and 
historical origin while preserving a large enough sample to permit sufficiently powerful 
statistical tests.
1 
Murdock (1968) initiated the pinpointing process when he analyzed nearly 1,300 
societies chosen for the completeness of their ethnographic coverage. He classified these 
societies into clusters based on the similarity of the cultures and categorized groups of 
clusters into 200 “sampling provinces” (Murdock 1968; Murdock and White 1969). From 
the initial 200 sampling provinces, two had no culture that could be accurately pinpointed 
to a particular locale and date, two were split in half, and 14 others were dropped because 
they were too similar to others in the sample. 
Murdock and White (1969) then identified that culture from each of the 186 
sampling provinces with the earliest period of satisfactory ethnographic coverage unless 
significantly richer data were available for a later period.  The 186 cultures selected in 
this step comprise the SCCS. The cultures in SCCS are assigned a number from 1 to 186, 
which facilitates statistical identification of those cultural practices that originate from a 
common cultural heritage. This is done because societies with close geographical 
                                                 
1 A sample of n=186 societies may appear small until one notes that the typical cross-country study in 
accounting frequently uses only four categories of countries based on accounting heritage (Anglo-
American, French, German, and Scandinavian).  The SCCS was begun in an era before statistical 
adjustments of standard errors for cross-sectional dependence became commonplace.  
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proximity are likely ones where cultural diffusion may still be a prominent force. Thus, 
the correlation between adjacent societies within the SCCS measures the extent to which 
the pinpointing process did not completely eliminate Galton’s Problem (more on this 
below). 
The initial study using the SCCS coded 22 variables related to subsistence 
economy and related practices (Murdock and Morrow 1970). Researchers who use the 
database code new variables, and these additional variables are added to the database as a 
result. Not all 186 societies are coded for all variables as some researchers elected to code 
data for only a subset of the SCCS cultures. For example, many variables are coded for 
only 93 cultures suggesting, for example, a sampling scheme such as using every other 
culture in the database.  
Thus, each new study increases the depth of the database. There are presently 
more than 2,000 categorical variables (as of 2007) coded nominally or ordinally by over 
60 different studies.
2 Unlike the usual market studies, the data we use are limited to only 
one observation per culture; thus, SCCS does not provide a pooled cross-sectional data 
set. The SCCS was designed to ensure that standard errors are not inflated by multiple 
observations from the same unit. 
  Our primary variable of interest is Recordkeeping (#149 in SCCS, entitled 
“Writing and Records”), which is coded on an ordinal scale from 1 (no records) to 5 (true 
writing and written records of modest significance).
3 Panel A of table 1 describes how 
this variable is categorized. 
< Insert Table 1 Here > 
                                                 
2 An online journal, World Cultures, founded by Douglas R. White in 1985, maintains, refines and expands 
the SCCS. The journal is available in paper and CD-ROM as well as over the Internet. The journal can be 
accessed at http://eclectic.ss.uci.edu/~drwhite/worldcul/world.htm. 
3 Murdock and Provost (1973) originally coded it 0 to 4 but the SCCS presently reports it from 1 to 5.  
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  A value of 1 for Recordkeeping signifies “writing, records, and mnemonic devices 
in any form are lacking or unreported.” Seventy-three (39.3%) of the SCCS societies are 
coded as completely lacking in records. The next level, coded as 2, refers to “mnemonic 
devices.” Forty-nine SCCS societies (26.3%) are coded as having mnemonic devices. 
Examples of mnemonic devices are the tokens used in ancient Mesopotamian exchange 
or the shells used as wampum by American Indians (Schmandt-Besserat 1992; Szabo 
2005). A specific example within the SCCS societies is that of the Kapauku Papuans of 
New Guinea, who make extensive use of shell artifacts in exchange (Pospisil 1963, 291-
293 & 300-311). Economists have noted that shells and similar artifacts can serve as 
money to promote exchange and that these monetary artifacts provide memory of past 
exchanges (Townsend 1989; Kocherlakota 1998). 
  A value of 3 for Recordkeeping indicates a society with non-written records. 
Twenty-one SCCS societies (11.3%) are coded as having non-written records. One of 
these societies is the Incas, who were pinpointed in 1530 AD shortly after the Spanish 
invasion of the Americas. The Incan quipu has long been seen as a basic accounting 
device to record transactions (Keister 1964; Urton 2002).  
A value of 4 for Recordkeeping denotes “true writing; no records.” Twelve of the 
SCCS societies (6.5%) fall into this category. This is the most ambiguous of the five 
categories for Recordkeeping. An examination of the ethnographic sources underlying 
this SCCS classification suggests that this category includes societies where written 
language is present. The authors sometimes note that written administrative records exist, 
but no examples are supplied in the texts on which coding is based. For example, 
Longrigg (1953, 21-25) describes book production and newspapers in Kurdistan around 
1900, Barth (1960, 32) notes that marriage contracts among the Basseri were written up 
by specialists in marriage rites, and Gamble (1967, 22-6) remarks that Wolof was the  
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commercial language in the Wolof society and that school books on this language existed 
as early as 1823.  
The final category for Recordkeeping (coded as 5) applies to those 31 SCCS 
societies (16.7%) classified under “true writing; records.” This group includes the society 
(Babylonia) with the earliest pinpointing date (1,750 BCE) in the SCCS sample. This 
date is at the end of Hammurabi’s reign as Babylonian monarch in a period when 
economic transactions and contracts data were stored on written clay tablets (Van De 
Mieroop 2002; 2004). 
  Figure 2 shows the frequency of alternative recordkeeping scores with the sample 
partitioned by the year that the culture is pinpointed. The data in panel A of Figure 2 
indicate that the incidence of written recordkeeping (as indicated by score of 5) is higher 
in the period 1935-65. However, the frequency of no recordkeeping (as reflected in a 
score of 1) is no lower in later periods than earlier periods. In addition, panel B of Figure 
2 indicates that the majority of non-recordkeeping cultures are located in Africa and 
South America. The frequency of cultures possessing written records is highest in the 
Mediterranean and Eurasia.
4   
< Insert Figure 2 Here > 
  An initial analysis of the SCCS data indicated that Recordkeeping is subject to 
stronger patterns of cultural and historical diffusion relative to other SCCS variables. For 
example, Recordkeeping displays strong correlation ( = 0.30) when comparing adjacent 
neighbors within the SCCS database. This suggests historical influences in 
Recordkeeping may have a large impact when evaluating the functional relationship 
between recordkeeping and the other economic variables. Consequently, we estimate our 
                                                 
4 These findings are consistent with Diamond’s (1997) theory that technologies were more likely to spread 
along the same latitudes in Eurasia than along the same longitudes in Africa and South America.  
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empirical models using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for residual 
correlation among observations belonging to the same major language family. Clustering 
the standard errors by major language family is consistent with the economic intuition 
that diffusion effects will have difficulty traversing major cultural/linguistic barriers 
between groups.  
  We use several other variables from the SCCS database in our analysis. These 
variables reflect various aspects of a society’s development in terms of economic and 
social complexity. We will introduce these variables and discuss their definition as we 
use them in our empirical analysis. 
 
3. Predictions 
  Social scientists have long been fascinated by why some nations or peoples have 
achieved greater prosperity than others that appear similarly situated.  At the most basic 
level, the explanations boil down to differences in natural resource endowments (e.g. 
climate, minerals, etc.) and/or differences in institutions (e.g. markets, religion, laws) that 
facilitate transformation of basic resources into valuable goods and services.  In this 
paper, we examine the contribution of one basic institution, early accounting, to 
differences in economic development across societies, after controlling for natural 
resource endowments. 
The simplest accounting systems create a record of historical economic 
transactions in which a one-way transfer or bilateral exchange has occurred. Transactions 
generate a “paper trail” of receipts, vouchers and contracts that can be used to verify 
transaction details in case of forgetfulness or subsequent disputes.
5 The double-entry 
                                                 
5 The “paper trail” documenting an exchange transaction, which is represented by receipts and ultimately 
the journal entry, is the foundation upon which modern accounting was built. Classical accounting scholars  
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system, whose origins trace to early 13
th century Italy, facilitated systematic aggregation 
and combination of these records (DeRoover 1955). Double entry has likely survived and 
spread because it conferred a competitive advantage on users through improved 
cooperation and coordination, both within and between organizations.  
The archaeological record is broadly consistent with the view that recordkeeping 
promotes economic development (Basu & Waymire, 2006). Transactional records are 
common to large-scale societies, even those that are pre-literate.  The first accounting 
records using “tokens” appear at the same time and place (c. 8000 BCE Mesopotamia) as 
the emergence of agriculture and permanent human settlements (Schmandt-Besserat 
1992).  Other non-written transaction records include the Incan “quipu” (knotted string) 
and the “tally stick” used all over the world (Robert 1956; Ifrah 2001, ch. 5 and 6). The 
Sumerians invented writing to keep records and accounts (3200 BCE), and this occurred 
at the same time as substantial increases in group size and population density in the 
earliest cities (Nissen et al. 1993).  Thus, accounting innovations in ancient Mesopotamia 
coincided with societal and economic development, suggesting a potential causal 
connection. 
The current paper uses anthropological field data to examine whether the tight 
coupling between accounting advances and economic development in the ancient Near 
East was unique, or a pattern that describes human societies worldwide. In addition, we 
examine whether recordkeeping emerges earlier than other economic institutions such as 
money and credit across different cultures, similar to the Sumerian experience. We find 
that more advanced recordkeeping (as measured by increasing levels of Recordkeeping) 
is positively associated with greater economic and societal development across a broad 
                                                                                                                                                
have long recognized the importance of basic recordkeeping and its role in providing memory of past 
exchange transactions (e.g., Hatfield 1924; Littleton 1933, 1953; Potter 1952; Ijiri 1975; Demski 1993).   
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cross-section of human societies that have been studied by anthropologists.  This paper 
thus provides more systematic evidence that generalizes the anecdotal archaeological 
evidence collected by Basu & Waymire (2006). 
In a parallel paper, Basu et al. (2007) conduct an experiment to evaluate whether 
recordkeeping emerges endogenously in complex cooperative exchange and how much it 
increases realized gains from trade. They implement a multi-person networked repeated 
version of the Berg et al. (1995) trust game, and contrast the history of transfers in games 
where players can(not) keep personal records.  Their results suggest that recordkeeping 
helps players to better remember the past behavior of anonymous partners over several 
rounds of play, and helps them to selectively transact with those players who have 
previously been cooperative.  In the laboratory recordkeeping economies, higher average 
and less variable returns are earned, trust and reciprocity increase among those playing in 
later rounds, and players’ economic risk is reduced because they can use more prior 
information in their decisions.  The stylized laboratory experiment in Basu et al. (2007) 
facilitates tracing of causal linkages between the societal ability to keep records and 
improved economic outcomes, but (like all experiments) lacks external validity. The 
current paper thus provides external validity to complement the experimental evidence 
provided by Basu et al. (2007), both in support of the Basu & Waymire (2006) 
hypotheses. 
  Figure 3 graphically summarizes the predictions that we investigate in this paper. 
Arrow (1) in the left-hand part of the figure depicts the emergence of accounting as a 
move from mental records to external records. That is, recordkeeping outside the brain is 
necessary for economic development and is expected to emerge early relative to other 
economic institutions. 
< Insert Figure 3 Here >  
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Relying solely on mental memory, humans are able to sustain social exchange at a 
scale greater than other primates.  This is largely because our evolved brains remember 
past interactions and analyze exchange opportunities more effectively than other species 
(Wilson 2000; Cosmides and Tooby 2005).  That is, human brains are adapted for social 
exchange and cooperation that improves our prospects for resource acquisition and 
survival.  Within a small kin-based group, mental memory of past interactions and gossip 
helps actors identify trustworthy partners for a contemplated cooperative venture 
(Barkow 1992; Demsetz 2002).  Hence, small groups will have little need for permanent 
external records because members can accurately track others’ reputations even if they 
cannot perfectly recall the particulars of specific past interactions (Silk 2004). 
  Keeping records outside the brain allows people to reliably store greater amounts 
of information on past interactions (Basu and Waymire 2006). Recordkeeping thus 
expands human capacity to “recognize other individuals and keep score” (Ridley 1996, 
83), which is a prerequisite for sustaining repeated cooperative social exchange and 
reciprocity (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Nowak and Sigmund 2005).
6  We therefore 
predict that external recordkeeping as measured by Recordkeeping will emerge relatively 
early compared to other economic institutions as societies become bigger and more 
complex. 
These arguments suggest that sole reliance on mental records will constrain 
societal expansion beyond a certain group size. Anthropological research suggests that 
                                                 
6 An organism’s ability to recall past interactions with its environment and adjust behavior in response is of 
first-order importance to its survival. This ability is important even for single cell organisms like the e coli 
bacterium (Allmen 2000, 3-8).  
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the unaided human brain can sustain stable cooperative groups to an upper limit of 
between 125 and 200 members.
7 Dunbar (2001, 181) writes: 
“(t)here is indeed a characteristic group size of around 125-200 that reappears with 
surprising frequency in a wide range of contemporary and Neolithic horticultural 
societies. These groups … all share one crucial characteristic: they consist of a set of 
individuals who know one another intimately and interact on a regular basis… Thus 
there seems to be quite strong evidence that at least one component of human 
grouping patterns is as much determined by relative neocortex size as are groups of 
other primates. We have bigger, more complexly organized groups than other species 
simply because we have a larger onboard computer (the neocortex) to allow us to do 
the calculations necessary to keep track of and manipulate the ever-changing world 
of social relationships within which we live.” 
 
Dunbar’s Number is the estimated limit to human group size in the absence of 
institutions that store data on past exchange outside the human brain. This suggests that 
external recordkeeping should become increasingly prevalent after groups reach a size 
exceeding 200 persons.  We predict therefore that the relation between Recordkeeping 
and group size will be nonlinear, with little association across groups of 200 or fewer 
persons and a positive association across groups exceeding 200 persons. 
In addition to increasing the number of potential partners, records also help 
parties coordinate more complex economic interaction. This is shown by arrow (2) in 
Figure 3 leading to the box to the right of external recordkeeping. Within animal and 
human families, many resource transfers are unidirectional grants, with little expectation 
of immediate reciprocity.  In small family- and kin-based units, unidirectional transfers 
can be motivated by love (parents for children), fear (low status members of alpha males) 
and ignorance (not recognizing that an object is valuable) (Boulding et al., 1972).
8  Most 
                                                 
7 “Dunbar’s Number” of 125-200 persons was calculated by correlating troop size and (neocortical) brain 
size across different primates such as monkey, baboons and chimpanzees, and extrapolating to expected 
human group size using actual human brain size. The predicted number was validated by studying the 
historical maximum sizes of hunter-gatherer tribes, Neolithic villages, Hutterite settlements, Roman army 
units, and other human groups. The computation of Dunbar’s Number is described in Dunbar (1992, 1998). 
8 Over lifetimes, such one-way resource transfers likely balance out, but given high mortality rates in these 
groups, there is less expectation of stable partnerships.  In more egalitarian societies, transfers between  
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primitive human societies are kin groups with a norm of generalized reciprocity, where 
help is expected from and is available to all group members (Sahlins 1972).  Many 
primitive societies engage in gift exchanges with neighboring societies (Malinowski 
1922; Mauss 1925), which promotes coordination of economic activity within these 
societies.  Power- and status-based hierarchies are also used to increase economic 
coordination and increase group sizes.  Such complex coordination inevitably entails 
norms of behavior and monitoring to reduce shirking and cheating, and we predict that 
recordkeeping will be more prevalent (i.e., Recordkeeping will take on larger values) in 
societies organized through large hierarchies.  
As the number of group members grows however, repeated interaction with 
familiar partners occurs less often.  In addition, individual cooperation with members of 
other groups cannot rely on familiarity or repeated interaction.  At some point in the 
recent human past, a new form of economic interaction arose in the form of bilateral 
exchange or barter (Seabright 2005) with an associated norm of balanced reciprocity 
(Sahlins 1972).  The experimental results in Basu et al. (2007) suggest that recordkeeping 
may be crucial to this transformation, in that experimental economies where 
recordkeeping was permitted exhibited stronger patterns of reciprocity than non-
recordkeeping economies.   Thus, we predict that recordkeeping is associated with more 
exchange transactions within human societies.  In addition, increased group size and 
more complex economic coordination should also lead to greater specialization and 
division of labor within these societies (Smith 1776).  
Cooperative exchange is likely crucial to economic development, so 
recordkeeping potentially plays a foundational role in human history.  If this hypothesis is 
                                                                                                                                                
spouses may have more of an implicit exchange character than in less egalitarian cultures.  Thus, we do not 
mean to characterize these transfers as necessarily excluding an exchange component, but rather want to 
emphasize that they are not purely exchange transactions between equals.  
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descriptive, we expect that the quality of various economic institutions enabled by 
recordkeeping should correlate strongly with measures of economic development. We 
predict that exchange transaction and hierarchical transaction measures should explain 
societal outcomes such as agricultural success, political stability, and permanent 
investment in tangible and human capital. Arrow (3) in Figure 3 indicates that larger 
groups develop a nexus of economic institutions to promote cooperative economic 
interaction. Further, although we expect Recordkeeping to correlate with these outcome 
measures incremental to natural resource endowments, its explanatory power will be 
reduced in the presence of these later institutions. Arrow (4) in Figure 3 represents the 
weakened direct association between Recordkeeping and outcome variables after 
controlling for hierarchies, market exchange, division of labor, and scale. 
To summarize, we investigate four predictions: 
(1) Recordkeeping is a necessary institution that will emerge early as an economy 
develops. 
(2) Recordkeeping exerts a direct positive effect on the use of hierarchical 
organization, market exchange, division of labor, and demographic measures 
such as group size and population density.  
(3) The extent to which a society develops institutions such as hierarchical 
organizations, markets, division of labor, and large groups will be positively 
associated with favorable societal outcomes like military success and investment 
in tangible capital and education. 
(4) Recordkeeping’s direct effect on the societal outcomes in (3) will be limited after 
controlling for the developmental state of a society’s institutions. 
 
4. Empirical Evidence 
 
4.1 The Emergence of Recordkeeping 
  Group size is extensively used to measure the scale of sustained cooperation 
within a given species; likewise it is used as a parsimonious measure of the scale and 
development of human social complexity (Chick 1997; Johnson and Earle 2000; Wilson  
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2000, 131-138; Dunbar 2001). Accordingly, we begin our empirical analysis by exploring 
the relation between Recordkeeping and group size using SCCS variable #63, Community 
Size, to partition the data. Community Size takes on eight possible categorical values. At 
the lowest are societies where ethnographers estimate the typical community size to be 
less than 50 persons and at the highest are communities that each comprises more than 
50,000 people. Panel B of Table 1 shows the various categories of Community Size. 
  Panel A of Figure 4 plots the frequencies of each Recordkeeping score for a given 
level of Community Size, where bubble size is proportional to frequency.  A line connects 
the mean Recordkeeping score for each of the eight sets of societies partitioned by 
Community Size categories. The societies that lack records cluster in the lower 
Community Size communities. Further, no SCCS society coded as having communities 
exceeding 5,000 persons (n=8) lacks recordkeeping. The Spearman correlation between 
Recordkeeping and Community Size is .32 (p < .01), which indicates a positive 
association between recordkeeping and the scale of social complexity.  
< Insert Figure 4 Here > 
This graph also shows that the mean Recordkeeping score increases 
monotonically once Community Size has reached categories indicting 200 or more 
persons. This is a statistically significant effect; a model with Recordkeeping as the 
dependent variable and Community Size as an independent variable indicates that the 
relation between Community Size and Recordkeeping is nearly twice as positive for 
societies with communities exceeding 200 persons. This evidence is consistent with the 
hypothesis that recordkeeping is more likely to be present when social and economic  
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interaction has reached a scale that cannot be sustained solely by unaided individual 
memory.
9 
  These data do not speak to when recordkeeping emerges relative to other 
institutions. To evaluate this, we compared Recordkeeping with several other SCCS 
variables. We used SCCS variables reflecting primitive division of labor, the use of 
money and credit in an economy, and the presence of administrative hierarchies. The 
variables we compare with Recordkeeping are: (1) Administrative Hierarchy (SCCS 
variable #91), (2) Agriculture (SCCS variable #151), (3) Credit (SCCS variable #18), (4) 
Food Surplus via Storage (SCCS variable #21), (5) Inheritance of Land (SCCS variable 
#278), (6) Judiciary (SCCS variable #89), (7) Money (SCCS variable #155), and (8) 
Technological Specialization (SCCS variable #153). These eight variables, all of which 
are ordinal, are defined in the Appendix. 
  Panel B of Figure 4 shows comparative data for Recordkeeping relative to the 
developmental state of these other economic institutions as proxied by alternative levels 
of Community Size. The figure plots for all nine variables the cumulative percentage of 
coded societies where the practice is absent by the point at which a society has reached a 
given level of Community Size. 
  The nine SCCS variables’ cumulative frequency functions cluster generally into 
four groups referenced by the capital letters on the right-hand side of panel B. Agriculture 
and Technological Specialization are in cluster A, which represent practices that are 
absent (present) in about 20% (80%) of the SCCS societies. This suggests that basic 
                                                 
9 With training, some individuals are capable of prodigious feats of mental memory such as memorizing 
religious texts or numerous digits of non-repeating numbers such as pi.  Thus, it is possible that some larger 
societies entrusted a few such individuals with a specialized duty of mental recordkeeping, or that memory 
was retained communally via folklore transmitted across generations through verse and song.  
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agriculture and primitive division of labor take root within human groups at low group 
size levels. 
  The next cluster (labeled B) includes Recordkeeping along with Food Surplus 
Storage, Money, and Inheritance of Land. These basic institutions are present in 
approximately 60% of the SCCS societies. This suggests that recordkeeping is a 
fundamental institution that, like monetary exchange and simple property rights systems, 
appears very early in an economy’s development. That recordkeeping and money emerge 
similarly is perhaps not surprising. As already noted, mnemonic devices can fulfill both a 
recordkeeping function and a monetary function (Townsend 1989; Kocherlakota 1998). 
  The final two clusters include Administrative Hierarchies and Judiciary (cluster 
C) and Use of Credit (cluster D). Practices in clusters C and D are present in nearly 50% 
and 35% of the SCCS societies, respectively. These data indicate that more advanced 
institutions like hierarchies, courts, and extension of credit appear later in an economy’s 
development after more basic institutions like recordkeeping, money and basic property 
rights. Overall, the evidence in Panel B of Figure 4 supports the inference that 
recordkeeping is a foundational institution that appears relatively early in an economy’s 
development. 
 
4.2. The Effect of Recordkeeping on Exchange, Division of Labor, Hierarchical 
Organization, and Demographics 
  We now investigate whether recordkeeping is associated with expansion in the 
scale and complexity of economic interaction within a society. We predict that 
Recordkeeping will enable increased use of market exchange and hierarchical 
organizations, greater division of labor, and more generally, more complex social 
organization reflected in demographics like urbanization and population density. We first 
combine multiple SCCS variables to obtain comprehensive measures for each of the four  
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institutional constructs using factor analysis techniques. We then use our factor estimates 
of these constructs as dependent variables and examine their relation to Recordkeeping 
after including additional variables to control for other natural endowments. 
  We estimated each of the four factors Market Exchange & Property Rights, 
Specialized Production & Division of Labor, Use of Hierarchies & Government, and 
Demographics using the variables listed in Panel C of Table 1.
10 To illustrate, no single 
variable in the SCCS directly measures a broad economic construct such as Market 
Exchange & Property Rights. To measure this construct, we used six variables, each of 
which likely captures an aspect of the underlying construct. We then perform a principal 
factor analysis using the communalities among these six variables to extract underlying 
dimensions. We used a minimum eigenvalue of one as the criterion to determine how 
many factors to retain.  
Panel A of Table 2 shows that one factor with an eigenvalue of 1.79 accounts for 
71% of the total variance of the six SCCS variables used in the Market Exchange and 
Property Rights analysis. Thus, we retain only one factor to specify Market Exchange & 
Property Rights.
11  
< Insert Table 2 Here > 
  Panels B to D of Table 2 show that one factor in each of Specialized Production 
& Division of Labor, Hierarchies & Government, and Demographics can explain 99%, 
                                                 
10 The variable Specialized Production & Division of Labor is a more complex measure of division of labor 
that is based on variables beyond the simple measure (i.e., Technological Specialization) we used earlier in 
constructing panel B of figure 4.  
11 Instead of four separate factor analyses, we also perform an iterated principal factor analysis on 12 
variables (three from each theorized institutional construct): Intercommunity Trade as a Food Source, 
Money, Credit Source, Technological Specialization, Agriculture, Intensity of Cultivation, Administrative 
Hierarchy, Jurisdictional Hierarchy beyond Local Community, Class Stratification, Population Density, 
Fixity of Settlement, and Settlement Patterns. We retain four factors from this analysis and rotate them 
using a promax oblique rotation. These four resultant factors correspond with the four institutional 
constructs in terms of strength of factor loadings. Defining our four institutional constructs in this manner 
gives qualitatively similar results to those reported in the ensuing analyses.  
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88%, and 88% of the variance in each of those measures. We therefore again retain only 
one factor from each of these analyses.  
Panel E shows the factor loadings between the four factors and the original 
variables.  The factor loading is the standardized coefficient in a regression of the 
variable on the factor and reflects the strength of the relationship. For example, note that 
Factor 1 (Market Exchange & Property Rights) depends more heavily on Intercommunity 
Trade as a Food Source and Money than on Food Surplus via Storage and Recent Large-
scale Slaveholding. The Division of Labor factor is most heavily influenced by the two 
measures of agricultural activity (Agriculture and Intensity of Cultivation). The 
Hierarchies & Government factor is most strongly related to variables reflecting 
Administrative Hierarchy and Political Integration, variables that represent the extent to 
which communities in the society are tied together by government and other political 
links. Demographics is most strongly associated with Fixity of Settlement, a variable that 
captures the degree to which people in the society live in permanent communities. 
  Panel F of Table 2 presents the Pearson and Spearman correlations between the 
institutional factors as well as with the variables Recordkeeping and Community Size, all 
of which are statistically significant with two-tailed p-values < 0.005. Consistent with our 
predictions, Recordkeeping is positively correlated with all four factors. The correlation 
between Recordkeeping and Market Exchange & Property Rights is the most positive 
among the four factors. In addition, the four factors are positively correlated with each 
other. 
  Table 3 presents the results from estimating two models of the relation between 
institutions and the presence of recordkeeping. In the first model, a dummy variable, 
RK_B, which equals one if recordkeeping is present, is included along with controls for 
resource endowments (AgPotential, Climate, and Region). In this model, the coefficient  
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on RK_B is positive for all institutional factors and significantly different from zero at the 
.05 level for all but Demographics. Consistent with the univariate correlations shown in 
panel F of Table 2, the model for Market Exchange & Property Rights has the greatest 
explanatory power in all cases. 
< Insert Table 3 Here > 
  The second model in Table 3 allows the effect of RK_B to vary more for societies 
where Community Size exceeds 200 persons (i.e., Large_Comm = 1). The results suggest 
that the interactive effect of RK_B and Large_Comm is positive and statistically 
significant for Market Exchange & Property Rights as well as Specialized Production & 
Division of Labor and Demographics. This evidence suggests that Recordkeeping plays 
an important institutional role in extending the market and the division of labor, both of 
which economists view as crucial to economic growth (Smith 1776, Book I, Chapter III). 
  To summarize, the evidence in Table 3 suggests that societies that use records are 
characterized by more extensive use of economic exchange, division of labor, and 
organizational hierarchies and government. These findings are generally consistent with 
the hypothesis that recordkeeping is necessary to promote the development of economic 
institutions. 
 
4.3. The Association Between Recordkeeping and Favorable Societal Outcomes 
  Our final two predictions are that more developed economic institutions will be 
associated with more favorable societal outcomes (e.g., greater food production through 
agriculture) and that the effect of Recordkeeping on societal outcomes is indirect. That is, 
any direct effect of Recordkeeping on societal outcomes will be modest when the effects 
of institutional development are controlled for. Thus, Recordkeeping improves societal  
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outcomes because it facilitates the development of economic institutions, which are the 
proximate cause of more favorable societal outcomes. 
  The measures of societal outcomes we examine are listed in Panel C of Table 1 
with specific definitions of these measures provided in the Appendix. These eight 
specific variables are measures of success in agriculture (Resource Base, Cropping Index, 
and Occurrence of Famine), warfare and political stability (Military Success, Frequency 
of Internal Warfare, and Political Autonomy), or long-term investments in tangible assets 
and human capital (Large or Impressive Structures and Education Investment).  
  We estimated Ordered Logistic regression models with these measures as 
dependent variables and the four factors from Table 2 as independent variables along 
with Recordkeeping. Control variables are included for resource endowments and 
community characteristics.  
Results for the estimated models are shown in Table 4. Three models are shown 
for each outcome measure. The first includes the four institutional factors as explanatory 
variables and the second is identical except that Recordkeeping is added as an additional 
explanatory variable. The third model includes only Recordkeeping as an independent 
variable with the institutional factor variables omitted. This model provides a benchmark 
for assessing how Recordkeeping influences societal outcomes. 
< Insert Table 4 here > 
  Three important features of the evidence in table 4 are worthy of mention. First, 
as we predicted, the institutional factors are significant in explaining the societal outcome 
measures. However, these effects are not uniform across the outcome measures. For 
instance, Market Exchange & Property Rights and Hierarchies & Government are 
positively associated with Resource Base and Division of Labor is positively related to 
Cropping Index as measures of agricultural success. None of the variables bear a  
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significant relation to the Occurrence of Famine. Likewise, the factors Specialized 
Production & Division of Labor and Hierarchies and Government are positively 
associated with Political Autonomy but bear no relation to the warfare variables. As to 
investments in tangible and human capital, Hierarchies & Government and 
Demographics are associated with Large and Impressive Structures and Market 
Exchange & Property Rights and Specialized Production & Division of Labor are 
associated with Education Investment.  
  Second, also consistent with our predictions, Recordkeeping bears no significant 
direct association with the outcome variables when the institutional factors are also 
included as explanatory variables. In contrast, the coefficient on Recordkeeping is 
positive and statistically significant at the .05 level or lower in all but two cases 
(Occurrence of Famine and Frequency of Internal Warfare) when the institutional factors 
are excluded. In short, the evidence in Table 4 supports our prediction that 
Recordkeeping has no direct effect on favorable societal outcomes independent of the 
economic institutions whose development it helps promote. 
  One limitation of the outcome measures examined in Table 4 is that they capture 
individual aspects of a society’s success. To obtain a more comprehensive measure of 
societal outcomes, we applied principal factor analysis to the eight outcome measures in 
Table 4 to obtain a single measure, which we refer to as Economic Development. Panel A 
of Table 5 indicates that a single factor with an eigenvalue of 1.89 accounts for 56% of 
the total variance of the eight outcome measures. Panel B of Table 5 shows the factor 
loadings of the eight original variables for Economic Development. The factor loadings 
show that Resource Base, Cropping Index, Large or Impressive Structures, and 
Education Investment are the outcome measures most strongly associated with Economic 
Development. Military Success and Political Autonomy have coefficients exceeding .25  
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whereas Frequency of Internal Warfare and Occurrence of Famine exert a limited effect 
on Economic Development. 
< Insert Table 5 Here > 
Panel C of Table 5 shows the results from OLS estimation of models identical to 
those in Table 4 except that now Economic Development is used as the outcome measure. 
These results are similar to the findings in Table 4 in that two institutional factors 
(Specialized Production & Division of Labor and Hierarchies & Government) are 
positive and significantly related to Economic Development at the .05 level or better. 
These effects remain highly significant even when Recordkeeping is added to the model. 
Consistent with the results in Table 4, the coefficient on Recordkeeping declines by over 
70% (dropping to .09 from .32) when the institutional factors are included in the model. 
However, the coefficient on Recordkeeping in model (2) is statistically significant at 
better than the .01 level. This is likely attributable to lower coefficient standard errors 
associated with the model’s high explanatory power (adjusted R
2 = .83). 
  To summarize, the evidence in Tables 4 and 5 is consistent with our prediction 
that recordkeeping is associated with favorable societal outcomes, but this effect occurs 
primarily through the effects recordkeeping exerts on the development of institutions that 
foster favorable societal outcomes. 
 
5. Conclusions 
  Our evidence suggests that recordkeeping, like money, storage of food surplus, 
and inheritance of land, emerges at relatively early stages of an economy’s development 
after the appearance of agriculture and primitive division of labor. The emergence of 
recordkeeping precedes the appearance of a judiciary, administrative hierarchies and the 
extension of credit. Our evidence also suggests that economies where recordkeeping is  
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possible are characterized by greater reliance on market exchange, more specialized 
division of labor, greater use of hierarchies and the provision of government services, and 
demographics indicative of greater social complexity. The institutions enabled by 
recordkeeping are associated with more favorable societal outcomes associated with 
agricultural success, political stability, and investment in tangible and human capital. 
  These findings suggest that the basic accounting function of recordkeeping is a 
precursor to economic development through market exchange, division of labor, and 
organizations. Thus, the evidence suggests that the relation between accounting and 
economic development is one where causality runs from accounting to market and 
organizational development rather than accounting being the result of demand derived 
from extant organizations and markets. 
  Our evidence suggests that basic accounting functions are necessary in extending 
the scale of human cooperation from small primitive human groups to large-scale modern 
human societies characterized by extensive market exchange and complex organizational 
hierarchies. These findings indicate that accounting emerges very early in economic 
development (Basu and Waymire 2006; Watts and Zimmerman 1986). Our results are 
also broadly consistent with conjectures offered by an earlier generation of scholars (i.e., 
Sombart, Weber, Schumpeter, and von Mises) that capitalist economies would be 
impossible without modern accounting (Most 1972; Carruthers and Espeland 1991). 
Thus, we call for future research on how recording and analysis of basic transactional 
data can extend a market order and may even fulfill the role of Adam Smith’s “Invisible 
Hand” in promoting beneficial economic interaction (Smith 1776).  
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Figure 1 
Panel A: The 186 SCCS societies over time 
The 186 Societies Over Time in the SCCS
2 11
332
9
6
9
7
10
12
15 16
14
31
14
24
7
0
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
<0 0-999 1000-
1499
1500-
1599
1600-
1699
1700-
1799
1800-
1849
1850-
1859
1860-
1869
1870-
1879
1880-
1889
1890-
1899
1900-
1909
1910-
1919
1920-
1929
1930-
1939
1940-
1949
1950-
1959
1960-
1969
1970
+
 
 
 
Panel B: The 186 SCCS societies by geographical location 
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Figure 2 
Panel A: The 186 SCCS societies over time by recordkeeping score 
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Panel B: The 186 SCCS societies by region and recordkeeping score 
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Figure 3 
The emergence of external recordkeeping and its relation to economic interaction and outcomes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mental Recordkeeping 
- Internal to the Brain 
- “Soft” Records 
- Applicable to Small 
Numbers of Transactions 
External Recordkeeping 
- Data Storage Outside the 
Brain 
- “Hard” Quasi-Permanent 
Records 
- Applicable to Large 
Numbers of Customized 
Transactions 
Increased Economic 
Interaction: 
- Hierarchical Organization 
- Specialized Division of Labor 
- Market Exchange 
- Scale 
(1) Transforms Into  (2) Leads to 
Favorable Economic Outcomes: 
- Agricultural Success 
- Military Success & Political 
Autonomy 
- Investment In Tangible Assets & 
Human Capital 
 
(3) Which Produces 
(4) Limited 
Direct Effect of 
RK on 
Favorable 
Outcomes  
 
33 
Figure 4 
Panel A: Mean and Frequencies of Recordkeeping Score Plotted Against Community Size 
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Frequency-weighted # societies Mean recordkeeping
 
Spearman  = .32 (n=185, p < .01) 
 
 
RECORDKEEPINGi = + 1COMM_SIZEi +  2COMM_SIZEi*LARGE_COMMi+ 3LARGE_COMMi + i 
 
Variable  Pred. sign  Coef.  p-value 
Community Size  +  0.54  0.01 
Community Size * Large Community  +  0.52  0.02 
Large Community  +/–  – 3.35  0.00 
 
 
RECORDKEEPING is SCCS variable #149 (Writing and Records) with categories defined on the y-axis in Panel A.  COMM_SIZE is SCCS 
variable #63 (Community Size) with categories defined on the x-axis in Panel A.  LARGE_COMM is an indicator variable equal to 1 if 
COMM_SIZE is greater than 200 persons and equal to 0 if COMM_SIZE is less than 200 persons.  The model is estimated using Ordered Logit.  
P-values are one-tailed where the sign is predicted and are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for residual correlation 
among observations belonging to the same major language family. 
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Figure 4 (cont.) 
Panel B: Cumulative percentage of SCCS Societies where a particular economic institution is absent plotted against community size 
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Table 1 
 Ethnographic Variables from Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS) for Recordkeeping, Group Size, 
and Other Measures Used in Empirical Tests 
 
Panel A: Recordkeeping Variable 
Writing and Records (SCCS Variable #149; n=186) 
  1 = None 
  2 = Mnemonic devices 
  3 = Non-written records 
  4 = True writing; no records 
  5 = True writing; records 
 
Panel B: Group Size Variable 
Community Size (SCCS Variable #63; n=185) 
  1 = < 50 persons 
  2 = 50–99 persons 
  3 = 100–199 persons 
  4 = 200–399 persons 
  5 = 400–999 persons 
  6 = 1,000–4,999 persons 
  7 = 5,000–49,999 persons 
  8 = > 50,000 persons 
 
Panel C: Other SCCS Variables Used in Empirical Analysis (See Appendix for definitions) 
 
Variable  Sample Size  SCCS Variable # 
Used in Factor Analyses 
Market Exchange & Property Rights 
   
Intercommunity trade as a food source  183  1 
Food surplus via storage  186  21 
Land transport  186  154 
Money  186  155 
Predominant use of animal husbandry  186  244 
Recent large-scale slaveholding 
 
186  919 
Specialized Production & Division of Labor     
Agriculture  186  151 
Technological specialization  186  153 
Intensity of cultivation 
 
186  232 
Use of hierarchies & government     
Executive   183  85 
Judiciary  183  89 
Administrative hierarchy  183  91 
Political integration   186  157 
Jurisdictional hierarchy beyond local 
community 
184  237 
Class stratification  186  270 
  
 
36 
Table 1 (cont.) 
 
Panel C: Other SCCS Variables Used in Empirical Analysis (cont.) (See Appendix for definitions) 
 
Variable  Sample Size  SCCS Variable # 
Used in Factor Analyses (cont.) 
Demographic 
   
Fixity of settlement  186  61 
Urbanization  186  152 
Settlement patterns  186  231 
Population density 
 
186  1130 
Societal Outcome Measures     
Large or impressive structures  186  66 
Political autonomy  184  81 
Guidance of formal schooling  177  Sum of 425 - 428 
Resource base   186  859 
Frequency of internal warfare  160  891 
Military success   172  908 
Cropping index  162  1128 
Occurrence of Famine 
 
170  1265 
Controls     
Endowments     
Region  186  200 
Climate type  186  857 
Agricultural potential 
 
186  921 
Community     
Compactness of settlement  186  62 
Community integration  186  73 
Prominent community ceremonials  186  74 
Family size  186  80 
Domestic organization  185  210 
Jurisdictional hierarchy of local community 
 
186  236 
Other Variables Used in Figure 4, Panel B     
Credit Source  169  18 
Inheritance of Land  155  278 
 
 
 
SCCS variable numbers are the corresponding variable code in the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample database.  Sample size is the 
number of societies (out of a possible 186) with non-missing coded data for that variable.   
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Table 2  
Results of Factor Analysis to Specify Variables for Market Exchange, Specialized Production and 
Division of Labor, Use of Hierarchies & Government, and Demographics 
 
Panel A: Market Exchange & Property Rights (Iterated principal factors) 
Factor  Eigenvalue  Proportion explained  Cumulative explained 
1  1.79  0.71  0.71 
2  0.37  0.14  0.85 
3  0.28  0.11  0.96 
4  0.09  0.04  1.00 
5  0.01  0.00  1.00 
6  -0.00  – 0.00  1.00 
 
 
Panel B: Specialized Production & Division of Labor (Iterated principal factors) 
Factor  Eigenvalue  Proportion explained  Cumulative explained 
1  2.11  0.99  0.99 
2  0.01  0.01  1.00 
3  -0.00  -0.00  1.00 
 
 
Panel C: Use of Hierarchies & Government (Iterated principal factors) 
Factor  Eigenvalue  Proportion explained  Cumulative explained 
1  4.39  0.88  0.88 
2  0.51  0.10  0.98 
3  0.09  0.02  1.00 
4  0.01  0.00  1.00 
5  0.01  0.00  1.00 
6  -0.00  – 0.00  1.00 
 
 
Panel D: Demographics (Iterated principal factors) 
Factor  Eigenvalue  Proportion explained  Cumulative explained 
1  2.59  0.88  0.88 
2  0.32  0.11  0.99 
3  0.04  0.01  1.00 
4  -0.00  -0.00  1.00 
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Table 2 (cont.) 
 
Panel E: Factor loadings (One factor retained from each) 
  Factor 1 
Mkt Exchange 
Factor 2 
Div Labor 
Factor 3 
Hierarchies 
Factor 4 
Demographics 
Intercommunity trade as food source  0.54       
Money  0.66       
Land transport  0.62       
Animal husbandry  0.66       
Food surplus via storage  0.21       
Recent large-scale slaveholding  0.24       
Technological specialization    0.61     
Agriculture    0.92     
Intensity of cultivation    0.95     
Administrative hierarchy      0.92   
Juris. hierarchy beyond local community      0.84   
Executive      0.82   
Judiciary      0.83   
Political integration      0.92   
Class stratification      0.71   
Population density        0.75 
Fixity of settlement        0.94 
Settlement patterns        0.88 
Urbanization        0.52 
 
Panel F: Pearson/Spearman Correlation Matrix 
Pearson (Spearman) correlations are shown above (below) the diagonal. The number of observations is reported 
below each correlation coefficient. Two-tailed p-values were less than .005 for all coefficients. 
 
Variable 
 
RK 
Community 
Size 
Market 
Exchange 
Division of 
Labor 
Hierarchies, 
Government 
 
Demographics 
 
Recordkeeping 
 
 
 
 
0.41 
185 
 
 
0.66 
183 
 
 
0.46 
186 
 
 
0.58 
180 
 
 
0.31 
186 
 
Comm. Size 
 
0.32 
185 
 
 
 
0.48 
182 
 
0.55 
185 
 
0.46 
180 
 
0.55 
185 
 
Mkt Exchange 
 
0.54 
183 
 
0.43 
182 
 
 
 
0.52 
183 
 
0.66 
177 
 
0.42 
183 
 
Div of Labor 
 
0.43 
186 
 
0.55 
185 
 
0.53 
183 
 
 
 
0.54 
180 
 
0.75 
186 
 
Hier & Govt 
 
0.49 
180 
 
0.44 
180 
 
0.65 
177 
 
0.52 
180 
 
 
 
0.50 
180 
 
Demographics 
 
0.35 
186 
0.61 
185 
0.50 
183 
0.74 
186 
0.57 
180 
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Table 3  
Association Between Recordkeeping and Market Exchange, Division of Labor, Hierarchies & Government and Demographics 
This table presents the association between Recordkeeping and broad economic institutions. Community size (related to Dunbar’s number) is also investigated as 
a variable that moderates the relationship between Recordkeeping and the institutional factors.   Two models are estimated for each institutional factor: 
(1) Institutioni = 0 + 1RK_Bi + 2AgPotentiali + 3Climatei + Region Dummiesi + i 
(2) Institutioni = 0 + 1RK_Bi + 2Large_Commi + 3RK_B*Large_Commi + 4AgPotentiali + 5Climatei + Region Dummiesi + i 
where Institution varies by model and is one of the four factors: Market Exchange, Division of labor, Hierarchies, or Demographics. 
 
 
Pred.
Sign 
Market Exchange    Division of labor    Hierarchies    Demographics   
Variable  (1)  (2)    (1)  (2)    (1)  (2)    (1)  (2)   
RK_B  +  0.45 
(0.00) 
0.28 
(0.03) 
 
 
0.39 
(0.01) 
0.26 
(0.08) 
  0.53 
(0.00) 
0.53 
(0.00) 
  0.21 
(0.09) 
0.08 
(0.37) 
 
Large_Comm      0.16 
(0.17) 
    0.41 
(0.01) 
    0.29 
(0.11) 
    0.49 
(0.02) 
 
RK_B*Large_Comm  +    0.43 
(0.03) 
    0.36 
(0.04) 
    0.03 
(0.45) 
    0.35 
(0.05) 
 
Controls                           
AgPotential    0.02 
(0.22) 
0.01 
(0.61) 
  0.07 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.00) 
 
 
0.05 
(0.01) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
  0.08 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.00) 
 
Climate    0.04 
(0.34) 
0.04 
(0.33) 
  0.13 
(0.01) 
0.11 
(0.01) 
 
 
0.15 
(0.00) 
0.14 
(0.00) 
  0.19 
(0.00) 
0.18 
(0.00) 
 
Region dummies    y  y    y  y    y  y    y  y   
                           
Adj. R
2    0.44  0.50    0.36  0.46    0.38  0.40    0.32  0.45   
N    177  177    177  177    177  177    177  177   
 
This sample is derived from the 186 societies of the Standard Cross Cultural Sample (SCCS), with N reporting the number of observations in each regression.  The models are 
estimated using OLS.  Market Exchange, Hierarchies, Division of Labor, and Demographics are our names given to the factors derived from the factor analysis in Table 3.  The 
factor is the dependent variable in the appropriate model.  RK_B is a transformed binary version of SCCS #149 (Records and Writing) where 0 indicates recordkeeping of any kind 
is absent and 1 indicates recordkeeping of any kind is present.  Large_Comm is an indicator variable that equals 0 when Community Size is less than 200 persons and equals 1 
when Community Size is greater than 200 persons.  Community Size is SCCS #63 and denotes the typical size of communities from the society. AgPotential represents the 
Agricultural Potential (SCCS #921) of the society’s region and is defined as the sum of land slope, soils, and climate scales – a more positive value indicates greater agricultural 
potential. Climate (SCCS #857) is a 6-scale categorical variable ordered in terms of open access to rich ecological resources.  Region dummies represent dummy variables based 
on which of the 6 major world regions the society is located in.  The associated p-values are one-tailed when a signed prediction is present and are based on heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors adjusted for residual correlation among observations belonging to the same major language family.   
 
40 
Table 4  
The Association Between Societal Outcomes, Economic Institutions, and Recordkeeping 
This table presents evidence of how economic institutions mediate the effect of recordkeeping on economic 
outcomes. 
The following ordered logistic models (1-3) are each estimated for different economic outcomes where the 
independent variable Outcome is replaced by the appropriate economic outcome variable from SCCS. 
(1) Outcomei = 0 + 1MKTi+ 2DIVi + 3HIERi + 4DEMOG + 5AgPotentiali + 6Climatei + 
Community Controlsi + Region Dummiesi + i  
(2) Outcomei = 0 + 1RKi + 2MKTi+ γ3DIVi + 4HIERi + 5DEMOG + 6AgPotentiali + 7Climatei + 
Community Controlsi + Region Dummiesi + i  
(3) Outcomei = 0 + 1RKi + 2AgPotentiali + 3Climatei + Community Controlsi + Region Dummiesi + i 
 
Outcome Measure  N  RK  MKT  DIV  HIER  DEMOG 
Pseudo 
R
2 
Agricultural Success               
Resource base 
 
176    1.25 
(0.00) 
0.17 
(0.66) 
0.70 
(0.00) 
0.67 
(0.08) 
0.41 
  176  – 0.16 
(0.55) 
1.33 
(0.00) 
0.19 
(0.63) 
0.76 
(0.00) 
0.67 
(0.09) 
0.41 
  176  0.50 
(0.01) 
        0.27 
Cropping Index  
 
155    0.39 
(0.11) 
3.34 
(0.00) 
0.27 
(0.18) 
0.11 
(0.79) 
0.43 
  155  0.17 
(0.25) 
0.30 
(0.20) 
3.31 
(0.00) 
0.22 
(0.27) 
0.11 
(0.77) 
0.44 
  155  0.70 
(0.00) 
        0.18 
Occurrence of famine 
 
161    0.17 
(0.62) 
0.02 
(0.95) 
– 0.38 
(0.19) 
– 0.23 
(0.60) 
0.15 
  161  0.01 
(0.94) 
0.16 
(0.64) 
0.02 
(0.96) 
– 0.38 
(0.18) 
–0 .22 
(0.60) 
0.15 
  161  – 0.11 
(0.55) 
        0.14 
Warfare/Political Stability               
Military success 
 
165    0.15 
(0.53) 
0.14 
(0.68) 
0.37 
(0.12) 
0.13 
(0.62) 
0.06 
  165  0.11 
(0.46) 
0.07 
(0.80) 
0.11 
(0.73) 
0.34 
(0.15) 
0.15 
(0.56) 
0.06 
  165  0.28 
(0.04) 
        0.05 
Frequency of internal warfare 
 
154    0.11 
(0.69) 
– 0.10 
(0.74) 
0.10 
(0.69) 
–0.10 
(0.76) 
0.11 
  154  – 0.21 
(0.18) 
0.25 
(0.42) 
– 0.07 
(0.82) 
0.18 
(0.47) 
– 0.13 
(0.71) 
0.12 
  154  – 0.09 
(0.53) 
        0.11 
Political autonomy  
 
176    0.14 
(0.73) 
0.35 
(0.06) 
1.46 
(0.00) 
– 0.49 
(0.01) 
0.17 
  176  0.29 
(0.14) 
– 0.05 
(0.91) 
0.32 
(0.08) 
1.35 
(0.00) 
– 0.47 
(0.01) 
0.17 
  176  0.65 
(0.00) 
        0.11  
 
41 
Table 4 (cont.) 
  
Outcome  N  RK  MKT  DIV  HIER  DEMOG 
Pseudo 
R
2 
Investment in Tangible and 
Human Capital 
             
Large or impressive structures 
 
176    – 0.52 
(0.25) 
0.47 
(0.14) 
0.66 
(0.08) 
1.41 
(0.00) 
0.25 
  176  0.03 
(0.85) 
– 0.54 
(0.25) 
0.46 
(0.15) 
0.65 
(0.08) 
1.40 
(0.00) 
0.25 
  176  0.35 
(0.01) 
        0.15 
               
Education investment 
 
168    0.58 
(0.01) 
0.57 
(0.02) 
0.08 
(0.35) 
0.36 
(0.06) 
0.08 
  168  0.28 
(0.08) 
0.41 
(0.08) 
0.55 
(0.01) 
– 0.03 
(0.68) 
0.36 
(0.05) 
0.09 
  168  0.56 
(0.00) 
        0.06 
 
 
This sample is derived from the 186 societies of the Standard Cross Cultural Sample (SCCS), with N reporting the 
number of observations in each regression.  The models are estimated using OLS or Order Logit depending on the 
dependent variable. The reported R
2 is the pseudo R
2.  The dependent variable in each model is listed in column one 
with expanded definitions in the Appendix.  RK is Recordkeeping (SCCS #149).  MKT, DIV, HIER, and DEMOG 
represent the four factors (Market Exchange, Hierarchies, Division of Labor, and Demographics) derived from the 
factor analysis in Table 3.  AgPotential represents the Agricultural Potential (SCCS #921) of the society’s region and is 
defined as the sum of land slope, soils, and climate scales – a more positive value indicates greater agricultural 
potential. Climate (SCCS #857) is a 6-scale categorical variable ordered in terms of open access to rich ecological 
resources.  Community Controls denotes a set of variables added to the model to control for community cultures and 
norms beyond the factors.  These variables are Compactness of Settlement (SCCS #62), Community Integration (SCCS 
#73), Prominent Community Ceremonials (SCCS #74), Family Size (SCCS #80), Domestic Organization (#210), and 
Jurisdictional Hierarchy of the Local Community (SCCS #236).  Region dummies represent dummy variables based on 
which of the 6 major world regions the society is located in.  The associated p-values are two-tailed and are based on 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for residual correlation among observations belonging to the 
same major language family. 
 
  
 
42 
Table 5  
Factor Analysis of Economic Development and its Use as a Measure of Societal Outcome 
 
Panel A: Economic Development (Iterated principal factors) 
Factor  Eigenvalue  Proportion explained  Cumulative explained 
1  1.89  0.56  0.56 
2  0.64  0.19  0.75 
3  0.33  0.10  0.85 
4  0.21  0.06  0.91 
5  0.16  0.05  0.96 
6  0.11  0.03  0.99 
7  0.03  0.01  1.00 
8  – 0.00  – 0.00  1.00 
 
Panel B: Factor loadings for Economic Development (One factor retained) 
  Factor 1 
(Economic Development) 
Resource base  0.55 
Military success  0.26 
Political autonomy  0.39 
Cropping index  0.75 
Frequency of internal warfare  0.04 
Large or impressive structures  0.52 
Investment in education  0.58 
Occurrence of famine  – 0.11  
N = 130   
 
Panel C: OLS Estimation Results for Model of Association Between Economic 
Development, Economic Institutions, and Recordkeeping 
 
The following models (1-3) are each estimated using OLS:   
(1) Economic Developmenti = 0 + 1MKTi+ 2DIVi + 3HIERi + 4DEMOGi + 5AgPotentiali + 
6Climatei + Community Controlsi + Region Dummiesi + i  
(2) Economic Developmenti = 0 + 1RKi + 2MKTi+ γ3DIVi + 4HIERi + 5DEMOGi + 6AgPotentiali + 
7Climatei + Community Controlsi + Region Dummiesi + i  
 (3) Economic Developmenti = 0 + 1RKi + 2AgPotentiali + 3Climatei + Community Controlsi + Region 
Dummiesi + i 
 
Outcome Measure  N  RK  MKT  DIV  HIER  DEMOG  R
2 
Economic Development  126    0.15 
(0.08) 
0.48 
(0.00) 
0.20 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.33) 
0.82 
  126  0.09 
(0.00) 
0.10 
(0.28) 
0.46 
(0.00) 
0.17 
(0.01) 
0.06 
(0.23) 
0.83 
  126  0.32 
(0.00) 
        0.59 
 
This sample is derived from the 186 societies of the Standard Cross Cultural Sample (SCCS), with N reporting the 
number of observations in each analysis.  Economic Development is the retained factor from the factor analysis in Panel 
A & B. RK is Recordkeeping (SCCS #149).  MKT, DIV, HIER, and DEMOG represent the four factors (Market 
Exchange, Hierarchies, Division of Labor, and Demographics) derived from the factor analysis in Table 3.  
AgPotential, Climate, Community Controls, and Region dummies are defined in Table 4.  The associated p-values are 
two-tailed and are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for residual correlation among 
observations belonging to the same major language family. 
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Appendix: SCCS Variable definitions 
 
  Constructs  SCCS Variables  Coding 
Recordkeeping  V149: Records and writing  1 = None   
      2 = Mnemonic devices       
      3 = Nonwritten records     
      4 = True writing; no records  
      5 = True writing; records 
  Community size  V63: Community size  1 =        < 50      
      2 =       50-99     
      3 =      100-199   
      4 =      200-399   
      5 =      400-999   
      6 =    1,000-4,999 
      7 =    5,000-49,999       
    8 =    > 50,000 
Market Exchange &  V1: Intercommunity trade  1 = No trade 
Property Rights  food source  2 = No food imports 
    3 = Salt & minerals only 
    4 = < 10% of food 
    5 = < 50% of food/less local source 
    6 = > 50% of food 
 
  V155: Money  1 = None  
    2 = Domestically usable particles 
    3 = Alien currency  
    4 = Elementary forms    
    5 = True money  
 
  V154: Land transport  1 = Humans only 
    2 = Pack animals 
    3 = Draft animals 
    4 = Animal-drawn vehicles 
    5 = Automotive vehicles 
 
  V244: Predominant use of animal  1 = Absence or near absence of large domestic  
  husbandry
12    animals 
    2 = Pigs the only large domestic animals 
    3 = Sheep and/or goals without larger domestic 
animals 
    4 = Equine animals (horses, donkeys); deer 
(reindeer); camels, alpacas, or llamas  
    5 = Bovine animals (cattle, mithun, water 
buffalo, yaks) 
 
  V21: Food surplus via storage  1 = None or barely adequate 
    2 = Simple or adequate 
    3 = Complex or more than adequate 
 
  V919: Recent large-scale slaveholding  1 = Not present 
    2 = Present at or immediate prior to pinpointing 
date 
    3 = Present within past fifty years 
    4 = Present within past one hundred years 
    5 = Present within past two hundred years 
    6 = Present within past three hundred years 
 
                                                 
12 In the SCCS, Predominant use of animal husbandry separates Equine animals; Deer; and Camels, alpacas or llamas 
into three separate categories.       
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Appendix: SCCS Variable definitions (cont.): 
 
  Constructs  SCCS Variables  Coding 
Specialized Production  V153: Technological specialization 
13  1 = No pottery, loom weaving,  
& Division of Labor      metalwork 
    2 = One of pottery, loom weaving, or metalwork 
    3 = Smiths, weavers, and potters 
 
  V151: Agriculture  1 = None 
    2 = 10% of food supply 
    3 = 10%; secondary 
    4 = primary; not intensive 
    5 = primary; intensive 
 
  V232: Intensity of cultivation  1 = No agriculture 
    2 = Casual agriculture, incidental to other 
    3 = Extensive or shirting agriculture 
    4 = Horticulture 
    5 = Intensive agriculture 
    6 = Intensive irrigated agriculture 
Use of Hierarchies & Govt  V91: Administrative hierarchy  1 = Absent     
    2 = Popular Assemblies  
    3 = Heads of kin groups 
    4 = Heads of decentralized territorial divisions     
    5 = Heads of centralized territorial divisions       
    6 = Part of centralized system    
 
  V237: Jurisdictional Hierarchy  1 = No levels (no political authority beyond 
  beyond local community     community) 
    2 = One level (e.g., petty chiefdoms) 
    3 = Two levels (e.g., larger chiefdoms) 
    4 = Three levels (e.g., states) 
    5 = Four levels (e.g., large states) 
   
  V85: Executive  1 = Absent 
    2 = Council 
    3 = Executive and council 
    4 = Plural executive 
    5 = Single leader 
 
  V89: Judiciary  1 = Absent 
    2 = Not local 
    3 = Executive 
    4 = Appointed by executive 
    5 = Priesthood 
    6 = Hereditary 
 
  V157: Political integration  1 = None 
    2 = Autonomous local communities 
    3 = 1 level above community 
    4 = 2 levels above community 
    5 = 3 levels above community 
 
  V270: Class stratification  1 = Absence among free men 
    2 = Wealth distinctions 
    3 = Elite 
    4 = Dual 
    5 = Complex   
                                                 
13 Technological specialization is coded in SCCS as 1 = None, 2 = Pottery only, 3 = Loom weaving only, 4 = 
Metalwork only, 5 = Smiths, weavers, potters.     
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Appendix: SCCS Variable definitions (cont.) 
 
  Constructs  SCCS Variables  Coding 
  Demographics  V1130: Population density
14  1 = < 1 per square mile 
      2 = 1 - 4.9 per square mile 
      3 = 5 - 24.9 per square mile 
      4 = 25 - 99.9 per square mile 
      5 = 99 - 499.9 per square mile 
      6 = 500 + per square mile 
     
    V61: Fixity of settlement  1 = Migratory 
      2 = Seminomadic-fixed then migratory 
      3 = Rotating among 2+ fixed 
      4 = Semisedentary – fixed core, some migratory 
      5 = Impermanent – periodically moved 
      6 = Permanent 
 
    V234: Settlement Patterns  1 = Nomadic or fully migratory 
      2 = Seminomadic        
      3 = Semisedentary      
      4 = Compact but impermanent settlements    
      5 = Neighborhoods of dispersed family 
homesteads     
      6 = Separated hamlets, forming a single 
community    
      7 = Compact and relatively permanent 
settlements     
      8 = Complex settlements         
 
    V152: Urbanization  1 = Fewer than 100 persons 
      2 = 100 – 199 persons 
      3 = 200 – 399 persons 
      4 = 400 – 999 persons 
      5 = Greater than 1000 persons 
  Societal Outcomes  V859: Resource base
15  1 = Low resources (ex. hunting, gathering, 
fishing) 
      2 = Unstable resources (ex. mounted hunting, 
shifting cultivation, intensive agriculture with 
no plow) 
      3 = High resources (ex. advanced horticulture 
with metal hoes, intensive agriculture with 
plow, pastoralism) 
   
    V908: Military success
16  1 = No – its boundaries/population are  
           shrinking 
      2 = Breaking even – what it loses in territory it 
takes from others 
      3 = No change – boundaries/population 
stationary (the population is able to replace 
those lost in war) 
      4 = Yes – its boundaries/population are 
expanding 
 
                                                 
14 Population density was changed from a 2-7 scale to a 1-6. 
15 Resource base was collapsed from a 12-point scale to a 3-point scale. 
16 The coding of Military success was reversed from the SCCS coding to facilitate interpretation.  
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Appendix: SCCS Variable definitions (cont.) 
 
  Constructs  SCCS Variables  Coding 
Societal Outcomes  V81: Political autonomy  1 = Dependent totally 
(cont)    2 = Semi-autonomous 
      3 = Tribute paid 
      4 = De facto autonomy 
      5 = Equal status in pluralistic society 
      6 = Fully autonomous 
 
    V1128: Cropping index  1 = No Agriculture or confined to non-food crops 
      2 = < 10% of land used per year 
      3 = 10%-29% of land used per year 
      4 = 30%-49% of land used per year 
      5 = 50%-99% of land used per year 
      6 = 100% or more of land used per year 
 
    V891: Frequency of internal warfare  1 = continual 
      2 = frequent 
      3 = infrequent 
 
    V66: Large or impressive structures  1 = None 
      2 = Residences of influential individuals 
      3 = Secular or public building(s) 
      4 = Religious or ceremonial building(s) 
      5 = Military structure(s) 
      6 = Economic or industrial buildings 
 
    V425: Guidance of formal schooling   1 = Informal training, with min guidance 
               (Early boys)
17  2 = Apprenticeship atypical or occasional 
    V426: Early girls  3 = Apprenticeship typical & frequent but  
    V427: Late boys     informal training  
    V428: Late girls    more prevalent 
      4 = Apprenticeship predominant 
      5 = Formal schooling atypical or occasional 
      6 = Formal schooling typical and frequent 
 
    V170: Occurrence of famine
18  1 = Very High 
      2 = High 
      3 = Low 
      4 = Very low 
 
Controls: Endowments   V921: Agricultural potential: sum of  4 = poorest potential, 5-22 = graded scale 
  Land slope, soils, climate scales  23 = richest potential 
 
  V200: Region  1 = Africa: Exclusive of Madagascar and Sahara 
    2 = Circum-Mediterranean: North Africa, 
Europe, Turkey, Caucasus, Semitic Near East 
    3 = East Eurasia: including Madagascar and 
Islands in Indian Ocean  
    4 = Insular Pacific: including Australia, 
Indonesia, Formosa, Phillipines 
    5 = North America: indigenous societies to the 
Isthmus of Tehuantepec 
    6 = South America: including Antilles, Yucatan, 
Central America 
                                                 
17 Variables 425-428 were summed to create a new variable “Education” that proxies for a society’s investment in 
education 
18 The coding for Occurrence of famine was reversed from the SCCS coding to facilitate interpretation.  
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Appendix: SCCS Variable definitions (cont.) 
 
  Constructs  SCCS Variables  Coding 
Controls: Endowments (cont.) 
  V1696: Biome  1 = Tundra, taiga, boreal forest 
    2 = Temperate deciduous, scrub, or temperate 
rain forest 
    3 = Tropical or temperate grassland 
    4 = Tropical rain forest 
    5 = Desert 
 
  V857: Climate type: ordered in terms  1 = Polar 
  of open access to rich ecological   2 = Desert or cold steppe 
  resources  3 = Tropical rainforest 
    4 = Moist temperate 
    5 = Tropical savanna 
    6 = Tropical highlands 
Controls: Community  V236: Jurisdictional Hierarchy of   1 = Two levels (theoretical minimum, e.g. family 
  local community     and band) 
    2 = Three levels 
    3 = Four levels (e.g. nuclear family, extended 
family, clan barrios, village levels) 
   
  V73: Community integration  1 = Lacking/low compared to segments or larger 
polity 
    2 = By common residence only 
    3 = Common identity, dialect, subculture 
    4 = Overlapping kin ties 
    5 = Common social or economic status 
    6 = Common political ties 
    7 = Common religious ties 
 
  V74: Prominent community   1 = Rites of passage 
  ceremonials  2 = Calendrical 
    3 = Magical or religious 
    4 = Individual sponsored and communally 
attended (e.g. potlatch) 
 
  V80: Family size  1 = Nuclear monogamous 
    2 = Nuclear polygynous  
    3 = Stem family 
    4 = Small extended 
    5 = Large extended 
 
  V62: Compactness of settlement
19  1 = Dispersed 
    2 = Spatially separated sub-settlements 
    3 = Partially dispersed with central core 
    4 = Compact 
 
  V210: Domestic organization  1 = Nuclear family, monogamous 
    2 = Nuclear family, occasional polygyny  
    3 = Polyandrous families 
    4 = Polygynous: unusual co-wives 
    5 = Polygynous: usual co-wife 
    6 = Minimal extended families 
    7 = Small extended families 
    8 = Large extended families 
 
                                                 
19 Compactness of settlement was recoded to be ordinal as suggested in the SCCS 
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  Appendix: SCCS Variable definitions (cont.) 
 
  Constructs  SCCS Variables  Coding 
Other Variables from Figure 4, Panel B 
  V18: Credit source  1 = Personal loans between friends or relatives 
    2 = Internal money lending specialists 
    3 = External money lending specialists 
    4 = Banks or comparable institutions 
 
  V278 Inheritance of real property  0 = Absence of individual property rights or rules    
  (land)
20  1 = Inheritance based on familial ties  
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Inheritance of real property was transformed from the seven level SCCS coding based on nature of descent dictating 
inheritance to a 0 – 1 variable. 